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are "blind." No one of them knows whether he or she is singled out for treatment. Those who are not treated are given a placebo perceptually indistinguishable from the drug. Moreover, the experiment is double-blind, with the experimenter not knowing which patient is receiving treatment and observing only how well the members of the entire population fare. Only after assessment is the experimental blindfold removed for final analysis.
That is the most favored case. Many treatments are not a matter of giving tablets. In comparing two kinds of surgery for breast cancer no one can be blind, and we have ethical problems about assigning one of the two modes of surgery to a patient "at random." At the very least, she should have some choice in the matter herself. When we turn to agricultural field trials for different fertilizers for a given type of grain, or different types of grain for a given climate, or a combination of the two, the "patient," the earth and her products, is taken to be blind, but we still hold it to be good practice to assign treatments to plots of land at random. Moreover, where it is practicable (e.g., with two types of fertilizer, as opposed to two types of grain) we think it would be good if the experimenter were blind, not knowing which plots had been treated in which ways.
There are several elements to the ideal empirical experiment that I have described. First, there is a notion of controls, untreated plots or persons. Second, there are the notions of blindness and double-blindness. Third, there is a notion of random assignment of treatment to a subset of the plots or persons, leaving the rest as controls. Without specifying the physical device used to apply treatments "at random," nor other elements of the design, I shall speak of an experiment using randomization in this way as involving a randomized design.
There is a related but distinguishable idea of (random) representative sampling. Here we have a population of interest. We wish to draw an inference about its age structure, the distribution of its tastes in pizza, or whatever. We draw a representative sample. One way to do this is to draw members at random, say by assigning a number to each member of the population and then using a table of random sampling numbers to select numbers and hence members of the population.
Naturally, both random representative sampling and randomized design can be modified in all sorts of sophisticated ways. In most representative sampling of people nowadays the population is stratified into blocks with different social characteristics, and then selections are made within the strata. There are many textbooks concerning the design of randomized experiments. The first and most illustrious was R. A. Fisher's The Design of Experiments, published in 1935.1 This date will strike many as remarkably late. The late emergence of random representative sampling has also been remarked and studied with some care.2 I have spoken with caution of virtues that are popularly attributed to randomization. I say "popularly" because nowadays most people who can follow the ideas but have not thought much about them take for granted that randomization is not only virtuous in the case of empirical experimentation, but well-nigh a necessity in order for experimental results to have any validity. It comes as some surprise that the experts in statistical inference do not agree-or, rather, fall into several camps, each severely convinced of its own rectitude. This lack of agreement has been apparent from the beginning. Fisher's views were widely contested from their inception in 1926. Although all branches of statistical reasoning have been greatly influenced by Fisher's often highly innovative conceptions, his immediate employment, for a central part of his life, was in agricultural experimentation. Many of his coworkers, with whom he had close bonds of camaraderie and mutual respect-I think, for example, of W. S. Gosset, founder of the t-test and much else-hotly disagreed with him.3 In 1932, when Fisher had a research student write a dissertation on randomized experimental design (at Rothamstead, but for a University of London degree), no one was willing to examine it, even though at the time Britain was still the leading center of pure and applied statistical theory.4
Fisher said, in essence, that one should divide fields into plots according to various geometric patterns and then randomly apply treatments to them. The geometric patterns were to be chosen on the basis of good sense and familiarity with agricultural practice. Gosset and a majority of traditionalists believed that "matched" or "balanced" arrangements were less subject to error, more instructive, and in general entitled one to draw firmer inferences. In a matched design, apparently equivalent items are paired; one is treated, the other not. In a balanced arrangement one decides, for example, that one half of the plots are to be treated and then selects them in a systematic way, following a geometrical rule. The rule is of course not chosen stupidly, but so as to counteract the expected characteristics of field variation-the fact that soil in one corner may be better than in another, or that moles are more plentiful on the southern border of the field, and so forth.
Undoubtedly Fisher won the day, at least for the following generation, but then a new, although not completely unrelated, challenge to randomized design arose. This came from the revival of the "Bayesian" school, typically associated with L. J. Savage's theory of what he called personal probability.S Here the object is to form an initial assessment of one's personal beliefs about a subject and to modify them in the light of experience and a theoretical analysis formally modeled by the calculus of probability and a theory of personal utility. It is widely held to be an almost immediate consequence of this approach that randomization is of no value at all (except perhaps to eliminate some kinds of fraud).6 Especially in recent years, Bayesians have defended this conclusion by many formal and informal stratagems. It remains true, however, that the broad mass of routine empirical experimenters take randomized design for granted and suppose that their employers would fire them if they did not. At a more theoretical and rarefied level the randomization-is-essential versus randomization-is-irrelevant debate has inevitably become vastly more subtle than in this introductory exposition.
II. A LACK OF PREHISTORY
My question is not about the soundness of artificial randomizers as tools for experiment and inference, but rather about their entry into experimental practice. Randomization now seems so natural that we think that it ought to have been with us since the advent of probability arithmetic and "the experimental method" in the mid-seventeenth century. Hence it comes as some surprise to learn that randomization in experiment came into common use only in the 1930s and that its point of origin was the vigorous campaign of an experimental officer at an agricultural research station in England.
The use of randomizers for making choices is ancient. Many early societies speak of the lot as a way of evading individual responsibility. A typical example, neither ancient nor recent, is the mass suicide at the mountain fortress of Masada in the Judaean desert. In A.D. 73, when the rebellious sect of Sicarii was about to be overcome by Roman troops, the men first murdered their wives and children and then drew lots to select ten who would kill the rest. After their task was completed, they drew lots to choose one man who would kill the other nine and then himself. Josephus, who tells this story, had been in the same situation as general at Jotopata in A.D. 67. His men insisted on a mass suicide pact. They drew lots, planning that the man to draw the n + 1st lot would slit the throat of the man who drew the nth lot. Josephus was one of the last two, and he and the other survivor called it quits. In one extant version of the story, his luck was "put down to divine providence." In another, Josephus "counted the numbers cunningly, and so managed to deceive others."7 Every reader will have an example of the early use of artificial randomizers, and many will have examples of probable cheating, as evidenced by the story of Josephus. That cheating with randomizers is all too easy in experimental design will become evident in what follows. But there is a great distance between the use of the lot and the design of experiments. Where should we look for the beginning of randomized design?
In "empirical" experimentation, to be sure. Peirce was a long-time student of errors of observation in geodesy and astronomy and had refined the theory of error to describe experimental phenomena in those domains.13 The work of Fechner and his successors in psychophysics was well known. Fechner held that there is a threshold below which one cannot discern small differences in, for example, weight. Peirce set out to refute this, holding that there is instead a continuum of decreasing accuracy adequately described by the law of error.
In the experiment Peirce conducted with Jastrow the experimenter or operator was separated from the subject by a screen, through which an adapted post office balance was inserted. On the experimenter's side the pan had a 1 kg weight on it; in addition, a small weight could be added to or taken off the pan. On the other side the pan was brought up to the point where it exerted pressure on the subject's finger. The experimenter presented weights to the subject in two ways. In the first, the subject was given the pressure of the 1 kg weight to experience; then the small weight was added after the subject said "change"; finally, after saying "change" again, the subject was presented with the pressure caused by the 1 kg weight. In the other case the subject was first presented with the pressure of 1 kg plus a small extra; then the 1 kg weight; and then, once again, 1 kg plus a small extra. Great mechanical care was taken to ensure that there would be no cue, except felt pressure, as to whether a weight was being added or removed. In addition the order of the trials was determined at random by a pack of playing cards. If red was drawn, the experimenter presented first the 1 kg weight, then a supplemented weight, and then the original weight. But if black was drawn, the order of presentation was reversed.
Aside from the mechanical devices employed in the presentation of the weights, the design of the experiment employed three novelties: the randomization was deliberate; the subject was not allowed to say that he could not decide whether the weight had been increased or decreased between the first and second presentations, and the subject reported confidence in his judgment on a scale of 0 to 3.
Peirce noted that randomization prevented the subject from guessing the order in which the weights would be presented. There would, however, be occasional long runs of one or the other color by chance "which would tend to confuse the mind of the subject. But Peirce was altogether clear on his use of randomizers. He was less explicit about the mathematical analysis of his data than about the mode of its collection, but he appears to have incorporated the mathematical properties of his device into the inferences that he drew from his experiments. Yet in the ensuing literature randomization entirely dropped out. In their classic 1892 study of small differences in sensation, G. S. Fullerton and James Cattell would merely write, for example, "Of course the different experiments in each series were made in an irregular order and the observer had no clue to guide him except the objective difference in the lights."15 (These authors tested discrimination for a wide range of phenomena, including very similar lights.) They might of course have used an artificial randomizer to ensure irregularity, but they do not seem to consider how it matters or that there may be any conceptual difficulty in-the concept of irregularity.
Although Jastrow provided a standard exposition of the Peirce-Jastrow procedure in 1888, he said nothing of randomization.16 Despite the later work of investigators such as Jastrow, Fullerton, and Cattell, Peirce's research was illreceived. One reason was the second novelty mentioned above: Peirce did not allow his subject the option of being undecided as to whether a weight had been increased or decreased. This was held to be unfaithful to psychological reality. E. B. Titchener provided a thorough survey of complaints of this sort, concluding with his own scathing remarks on Peirce's idea. 17 Throughout the debate the procedure of randomization is just never mentioned. Naturally it was important to Peirce's program to insist that the subject should always cast a vote, even when he had no confidence in the judgment expressed. For Peirce's thesis was that as two stimuli become more and more similar, people become continuously less good at telling them apart, but there is no threshold below which judgment is entirely worthless.
It was precisely because of this thesis that Peirce introduced his third novelty, according to which the subject ranked his confidence in his judgment on a scale of 0 to 3. Why 0 to 3? Ever practical, Peirce marked each playing card, starting in the upper left corner, with no punches, one punch, two punches, or three punches. The experimenter then kept score as follows. If the subject judged correctly, the card was placed face down; if incorrectly, the card was placed face up. Moreover, the card was placed with no, one, two, or three holes in the upper left corner of the pile, according as the expressed degree of confidence was 0, 1, 2, or 3. This enabled accurate scorekeeping to be done as quickly as possible, to avoid tiring or boring the subject. Peirce expected that the subject's confidence would decline as the objective probability of correctness of his guesses decreased, and he derived a logarithmic formula to this effect that roughly fit his data. Here his background interest was that of the practical geodesist. 18 Comparative testing of subjects that were blind as regards the treatments administered became standard in psychology. Randomization had to wait three decades and even then was regarded as a trifling adjunct to an experiment. The features that interest a statistician went unexamined. As for Peirce, he was convinced that his experiments had shown that there is no minimum perceptible difference. His concluding sentences are instructive. It is to. be recalled that 1883 was the year of his painful divorce and remarriage, a divorce that hinged in part on what a woman might be expected to know, and that 1884 was the year that Peirce's appointment at Johns Hopkins was terminated.
The general fact [of no threshold] has highly important practical bearings, since it gives new reason for believing that we gather what is passing in one another's minds in large measure from sensations so faint that we are not fully aware of them, and can give no account of how we reach our conclusions from such matters. The insight of females as well as certain "telepathic" phenomena may be explained in this way. Such faint sensations ought to be fully studied by the psychologist and assiduously cultivated by every man.19
The word telepathy was less than two years old when Peirce wrote these words, but the Eastern seaboard was awash with enthusiasm for the idea. The American Society for Psychical Research was about to be founded, and its first project was a survey to determine the frequency of telepathic phenomena.20
It is hardly surprising that, having turned to psychology, we should now move to an inquiry on its margins, one that has been called parapsychology. The Gossets who preferred balanced design were not mere traditionalists. They had good arguments (which, indeed, to an experimenter are more compelling than the purely abstract schematism of the Bayesian latter-day antirandomizers). The arguments were in part based on experience of the causes of variability in field plots and systematic ways to avoid those causes. But suppose we turn to a subject about which nothing whatsoever is known, so that one cannot even begin to speculate intelligently about causes of variation? Suppose, further, that it is a subject redolent of fraud, an activity that even Bayesians admit can be controlled for by randomization? That is where we should be looking: psychic research. The more "empirical" and nontheoretical a question, the more randomization makes sense.
IV. TELEPATHY AND THE SOCIETY FOR PSYCHICAL RESEARCH
Most of us now tend to lump telepathy together with spiritualism, or, better, what I shall call spiritism, since the former also denotes a more or less coherent body of religious beliefs. Spiritism includes beliefs in poltergeists, ectoplasm, and the various activities of spirits that are provoked by the intercession of mediums. We now tend to put telepathy in with all that. In fact telepathy was a scientistic reproach to spiritism.
Spiritism and mediums came into the world in 1848 in Hydesville, near Arcadia, New York. The precise site was the home of Mr. and Mrs. John Fox, who heard knocking. The fad took America and Europe by storm. As Henri Ellenberger states: "At the beginning of 1852 the wave of spiritism crossed the Atlantic, invading England and Germany. In April 1853 it swept over France and soon reached all parts of the world."'21 The Oxford English Dictionary reports that the expression thought-reading-the spiritist term for which telepathy was proposed as a "scientific" substitute, was used in print in 1850. The word medium in the pertinent sense came in at about the same time.
Although mediums had various pretensions, their chief claims were three in number. First, they were able to produce remarkable phenomena in certain circumstances. Second, they were able to know a great deal about the past and present of members of the seance, even those whom they had never set eyes on before. Third, they were in contact with members of the spirit world-souls (or whatever) of the departed-who produced the phenomena and the information. A substantial number of what I shall call scientistic persons thought, often from personal experience, that the first two claims were substantiated, despite the number of known frauds. But they proposed an alternative hypothesis for the third claim, in particular as it concerned knowledge about other people. The medium's information did not necessarily come from the spirit world. It was obtained by transference of thoughts, or telepathy, from other members of the audience.
Several scientistically minded societies were formed to investigate the phenomena. The first and most important was the Society for Psychical Research, founded in London in 1882. Its members and associates included celebrated physical scientists of the day: Sir William Crookes, Lord Rayleigh, and Sir Oliver Lodge, for example. Crooke's radiometer-small painted vanes in a vacuum that rotate in sunlight-was invented as a tool -for investigating what has since been called psychokinesis (minds making motion). Its physics still happens to be a little in question, with the pressure of light competing with convection currents as the conjectured cause of rotation. The leading scientists who studied telepathy were drawn from the physical rather than the life sciences. Several reasons for this are readily perceived. Inexplicable emanations and vibrations were attractive to those engrossed with the problems of the electromagnetic ether. In contrast, Alfred Russel Wallace, the naturalist and evolutionary pioneer, parted from the SPR on the grounds that its standards of evidence and models of reality, derived from physics, were inappropriate. He remained an "honourary member," but preferred to do his psychic research outside of the society, with mediums.
The men and women of the Society for Psychical Research came from an intellectual elite whose center was Cambridge University. They found the raging popular middle-class spiritualism and spiritism entirely repugnant.22 Their scientistic approach was an attempt to preserve the phenomena for purer minds. Crookes, Lodge, and Rayleigh did embrace a deep-seated spiritualism to which they were far more committed than the chiefly curious nonscientist intellectual members of the society. They did not want spiritualism debased by fads and enthusiasms, and they preferred not to resort to mediums or other "sensitives" for their phenomena. Henry Sidgwick, Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge, was first president of the SPR. His most lasting written work is his Methods of Ethics (1874), which is still a subject of study today. He was an important public figure and the leading man of his day to work for the higher education of women. A thoroughly balanced account of the SPR is given by Janet Oppenheimer, The Other World: Throughout these discussions the highest standards of positivist scientific methodology were observed. Or rather, the highest standards of theoretical methodology, the sort of thing still often taught in philosophy of science courses today. The enthusiasts of the society were not, however, so attentive to their experiments. Quite aside from charges of fraud, they were not able to think very carefully about how to analyze their data.
V. RICHET'S RANDOMIZERS
There were a number of standard topics for investigation in the early days of the Society for Psychical Research. They are still the stock in trade of psychics and magicians. Objects were hidden in a part of a room, and people who did not know what they were, were asked to draw pictures of them. One person would form an image, which the other members of the party would sketch. Cards were drawn and sealed in envelopes; then others would guess the card. Words were written down and their successive letters guessed. These early inquiries of the SPR needed no mediums, no enthusiasts, no sensitives. They were "objective." They required no admixture of social classes. The society also examined reports of phenomena from outside its circle of members and friends, but it found its investigations of telepathy peculiarly fitting to its status and associated methodology.
Nevertheless, the first methodological breakthrough came from across the Channel, from Charles Richet. Richet was a Parisian physiologist with a fascination with the odd. Although the study of hypnotism had become disreputable, Richet was much taken by its vogue in stage performances and reintroduced it to scientific study, to Jean-Martin Charcot, Pierre Janet, and Sigmund Freud. It was he who most seriously took up the phenomenon of automatic writing. Whenever there was something strange connected with the psyche, Richet was the first to look into it. He deserves a far larger place in histories of the origin of psychoanalysis than is commonly granted. He took eagerly to split personalities, which manifested themselves and were fully seen as such first in 1875. Richet was so excited by the phenomenon that in 1889, under the pseudonym Charles Epheyre, he published a split-personality novel whose characters are far truer to the clinical practice of the day than any Jekyll and Hyde.26 they commenced in 1882. The reports on telepathy introduced him to another strange aspect of the mind, which he studied intensively from 1884 to 1890. Richet's first article on the subject, which ran to sixty-six pages, bore the title "La suggestion mentale et le calcul des probabilites."27 "Suggestion mentale" is his rather positivistic choice of words for thought transference.
We now think of probability as so integral a part of scientific method and practice that we are astonished to recall how ground-breaking a paper this is. Richet was only speaking the truth when, in 1884, he wrote of "using a method which is extremely rarely in usage in the sciences, the method of probabilities."28 His first run of experiments was conducted 25 June to 13 July 1884-by chance, only a few months after those of Peirce and Jastrow.
Richet hardly introduced probabilistic reasoning into psychology, let alone into science in general. Fechner, Wilhelm Wundt, and other investigators of psychophysics had been using probability modeling since the 1850s. Hermann Ebbinghaus was modeling short-term memory by probability in 1879, although he published this work only in 1885. But it remains true that, outside of astronomy and geodesy, probability had very little role in scientific inference at the time that Richet wrote. Biometrics, so valuable a source of probability ideas by 1900, and the origin of a lot of our statistical ideas, was in its infancy, or perhaps its prenatal state. Psychophysics primarily involved modeling phenomena by probability structures and was little concerned with questions of inference. Richet, although using the most trivial of probability models for cards, was concerned above all with questions of probable inference. He did not invent a single idea and was indeed quite ignorant of ideas known to Pierre-Simon de Laplace a century earlier. But he did something that, though obvious, no one had quite thought of doing before.
After reading the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research for a year or so, Richet (like many others) came to the view that weak powers of telepathy might be common to the population at large. How would one detect a weak ability of this sort? Only sometimes would a person actually transfer the thought of another to his or her own mind. So Richet proposed a long sequence of trials in which an "agent" drew a playing card at random and concentrated upon it for a short time, after which a "reagent" guessed the suit of the card. Some 2,927 guesses were made by various reagents in sequences of various length. In each sequence the expected number of successes was compared with the actual number, and a rather primitive statistical inference was drawn. In the total sequence of guesses there were 789 successes, whereas 732 is the expected number. "Among adult persons in good health who are not hypnotised, it is possible that mental suggestion [i.e., what the SPR was calling telepathy] can be experienced. This mental suggestion is even, in a small measure, probable, but with a probability that scarcely exceeds there is some probability for the hypothesis of mental suggestion-low, but not negligible.
The result was not very thrilling for the SPR, but the method was. Edmund Gurney, one of the founding members of the society, concluded in a resume of Richet's paper that it "can hardly fail to be a permanent landmark in the slowly widening field of psychical discovery." In the paper Richet, disappointed with cards, went on to various other probabilistic studies. He conjectured that telepathy was less a mental than a motor phenomenon, so that your thoughts would show up in my muscles rather than my mind. He tested this notion probabilistically, with various kinds of divining rod. An object was buried under one of twelve trees in an orangery or hidden in a certain shelf of Richet's large library. He found better results with rods than cards; the outcome was better still when he experimented with various kinds of "lucidite" or clairvoyance. These last experiments involved sketching concealed objects. Gurney complained of a "caution of statement in the wrong place." He thought that Richet had derived too low a probability for telepathy from his data. If caution were called for, it was on the score of the data themselves. Might cheating or cuing have been involved?30 In the next section I return to the issue of how to assess the probabilities given the data-not one of Gurney's strong points.
In 1888 Richet published a further 150 pages in the Proceedings of the SPR, followed in 1890 by a curious paper on "hypnotic lucidity or clairvoyance." He had decided that the work with cards showed nothing. Moreover, this very fact cast doubt on experiments on clairvoyance, in which one person was supposed to reproduce a diagram shown to another. In the case of cards, "we have a fact absolutely negative, which must inevitably cast some doubt on the experiments in the reproduction of diagrams."31 He had become convinced that clairvoyance could exist only in exceptional persons. This was an era, especially in France, of great popular interest in somnambulism, hypnotism, automatic writing, hysteric anesthesia, and the like. That interest would furnish the unusual people Richet needed. Richet began exhausting experiments on a woman whom Janet had already made well known; we might speak of Janet loaning her to Richet. One playing card was placed in a sealed envelope; over several hours, she had to bring the card to her mind. Richet's dedication was matched only by his incompetence. The woman in question, one Leonie or Leontine, was one of the famous early split personalities (she had a third personality who apparently did not make herself available to Richet).32 She had long been a stage companion of conjurers and mesmerists, and one of her personalities was a great tease. It is so obvious that she would have taken Richet in-given his own accounts of his "experiments"-that one blushes for the good man. He himself noted that the envelopes were only opaque but persuaded himself that Leonie was not cheating.
So much is an aside. Richet introduced the study of probability into psychic research-and as an inferential tool into psychology in general-by testing the ability of reagents to improve on chance by guessing at randomly drawn cards. Second, in these experiments he drew entirely negative conclusions in the end. This is not to say that his enthusiasm for psychical enquiries came to an end. On the contrary: he became convinced only that probability was the wrong investigative tool. One should not use randomizers on a large and typical population, but rather should turn one's attention to sensitives.
Richet The quality of the papers will be more apparent to the probabilist than to the general historian, and I shall not report them in detail. In part he plays Solomon between Gurney and Lodge, but without mentioning them by name. He first of all points out that the experimenter must choose the physical model in terms of which to test the data to see whether they indicate the presence of some anomaly. He speaks of "two schemata that present themselves, each recommended by high authority." In the first we proceed "by inverse probability, upon the principle of Bayes." After developing a formula he continues with the second procedure: "But however well established the preceding formula as an organon of statistics, the following schema, savouring more of Bernoulli than of Bayes, is perhaps more appropriate to the particular problem at hand."36 He does conclude that the probability that Richet's phenomena were obtained by chance is very small, 0.00004, and so the reliability of the phenomena not being due to chance "may fairly be regarded as physical certainty" and "the conclusion may be regarded as safe." After this, with some sagacity, he concludes his 1885 paper with the words: "Such is the evidence which the calculus of probabilities affords as to the existence of an agency other than mere chance. The calculus is silent as to the nature of that agency-whether it is more likely to be vulgar illusion or extraordinary law. That is a question to be decided, not by formulae and figures, but by general philosophy and common sense." This warning may be compared with a rather celebrated assertion by R. A. Fisher on the logic of significance testing. He speaks of a "logical disjunction" being the basis of a test of significance. Either something very uncommon has occurred by chance, or a hypothesis of "no effect" must be rejected. Fisher explicitly introduced these observations in connection with "the studies known as parapsychology. published other and more detailed conjectural explanations of the phenomenon of thought transference. They surveyed the literature, chiefly as furnished by the SPR; their main target, however, was a series of experiments conducted by the Sidgwicks, who used a young man who was probably a scoundrel, G. A. Smith, and four youths whom he had hypnotized. These experiments involved not cards but the transfer of numerals from one mind to another. Hence one issue was the initial selection of the digits. In addition there were the usual questions about possible cuing, for which Hansen had an ingenious explanation, and fraud. 40 Incidents involving Smith are among the least delectable in the history of the SPR, and it has been conjectured that Gurney committed suicide on learning that Smith was a fraud.4' But Hansen and Lehmann did not know the inside story, and dealt only with the data as reported. Lehmann and Hansen proposed that two unlooked-for effects of this type of experiment jointly produce positive results. Their first paper appeared under the title "On Involuntary Whispering," which referred to Hansen's contribution. He argued that at least from the time of Richet experimenters had unwittingly whispered the name of the card or number they were thinking of, thus cuing the subject by unnoticed but indisputably physiological means. Hansen's devices to test and illustrate this idea were ingenious, but his hypothesis does not concern us here. Lehmann's contribution is the one that bears on randomization.
Lehmann remarked that when people guess cards or numbers they make some guesses more frequently than others. The observation was not novel. In 1886 Charles Sedgwick Minot, reporting to the American Society for Psychical Research, had noticed that a great many people have what he called "number habits." Surveying chiefly the work of the SPR in London, he concluded that this fact is "unfavorable to the ideas of thought-transference having taken place in any of the experiments with digits." The reasoning was that the digits guessed by a subject were not "caused" to occur in their order by transference of thoughts from another person. On the contrary, the cause was a "characteristic and personal number-habit, and this habit regulates" the guesses. The habit in some cases is shown to be "exceptionally rigid and persistent. "42 It leaves no room for action at a distance by the thoughts of another.
Lehmann made his observation to support a different point. If both the experimenter and the subject had the same or similar number habits, then the numbers they produced would show much better than merely chance agreement. This possibility, argued Lehmann, vitiated the experiments performed with Smith as the main agent. experimenters who worked in connection with the Society for Psychical Research were accustomed to use the method of drawing numbers at random, and it is hardly necessary to say that all the number-guessing in the experiments, of Professor and Mrs. Sidgwick was carried out on this plan."43 Alas, matters are not quite so simple. It was necessary to say that the Sidgwicks had used the plan of random sampling numbers. They seem not to have said so themselves, although given the discussion initiated by Richet's paper of 1884, one would expect the idea to have been commonplace.
As for the reference to Phantasms of the Living: this is the work of Gurney, Myers, and Frank Podmore, stalwarts of the SPR.44 It was published in 1886, and its main project was to conduct a "census" of persons who had hallucinated the appearance of a person within twelve hours of the latter's death, and with no grounds for believing that the person would die at that time. These events were found to be sufficiently common in a sample to argue that these ghost stories (as Peirce was to call them derisorily) were strong evidence of a certain type of telepathic communication. The labors of the three men (especially Gurney) were prodigious in this enterprise, to which I shall return. But there were also passing references to other evidences for telepathy, and the passage cited first by Myers (Vol. I, pp. 31-35) considers the work of Richet. However, the data supporting the claim that from 1886 SPR members always randomized were excessively thin.
On page 34 of Volume I there is exactly one reference to randomizing: "And still more remarkable is the result obtained by the Misses Wingfield, of the Redings, Totteridge, in some trials where the object to be guessed was a number of two digits-i.e. one of the 90 numbers included in the series 10 to 99-chosen at random by the agent. Out of 2,624 trials, where the most probable number of successes was 29, the actual number obtained was no less than 275." After observing that there were a good many more correct reverse-order guesses, we read that "the argument for thought-transference afforded by the total of 275 cannot be expressed here in figures, as it requires 167 nines-that is, the probability is far more than the ninth power of a trillion to 1" (a European trillion, rather than an American one).
In Volume II we have the "cases too late for insertion in their proper places," where we learn more about the Misses Wingfield: "Miss M. Wingfield, sitting six feet behind the percipient, drew a slip at random, and fixed her attention on the number which it bore; Miss K. Wingfield made a guess at the number, and the real number and the guess were at once recorded in the Table. The slip of paper was then replaced, the contents of the bowl shuffled, and another draw made at hap-hazard." Miss K. Wingfield made 27 hits in 400 trials, and in 21 cases gave the digits in reverse order; in 162 other cases one of the digits was in its right place. The writer concludes that the odds here "are nearly two hundred thousand million trillions of trillions to 1."
To these odds we shall return, but first a word on Kate Wingfield. She was a protegee of Myers, who encountered her in 1884. We have not the slightest reason to doubt that a process of randomization was used in this case, for the technique had been promulgated by Richet, and Myers would assuredly have commended this method to the Wingfield girls. On the other hand, we now well know the difficulty of randomizing slips of paper that are extracted and replaced. Bowls filled with pieces of paper have "number habits." Myers provided no information on the number of occasions on which the Wingfields conducted such experiments. If they were performed on a number of occasions, and if, moreover, Miss K. Wingfield heard Miss M. Wingfield indicate on each trial if she were successful-so that a good run would be continued and a bad one discontinued-the success of Miss K. Wingfield on two experiments is less astonishing by far than Myers imagined. There is no need to postulate any conscious fraud whatsoever, and we may suppose that these incidents of randomization teach us more about defective randomizers than anything else.
It should also be recorded that Kate Wingfield appears to drop out of the psychic world, but did not in fact do so. She is the "Miss A." who occurs repeatedly in communications to the SPR, chiefly from Lady Radnor. She was a welcome member of seances at country houses and gradually assumed a complete repertoire, passing from rapping, table lifting, and automatic writing to crystal balls and, in the end, to serving as a full-trance medium.45 Some forty years after her first experiments in number guessing she released to the world specimens of to guessing playing cards. Here there were two groups of experiments, one using students and one using amateur or professional psychics. In the former case there were 97 agents and 105 reagents. The agent, it will be recalled, picks a card at random and in various ways thinks about it, while the reagent states what card it is. These 202 investigators were from the general lecture course in psychology, augmented by a few, such as Coover, who were engaged in laboratory work in the psychology department. They were majors in twenty different subjects at Stanford and represented twenty-one states in addition to the several regions of California. All were chosen on the condition that they were generally favorable to the hypothesis of telepathy and similar topics of spiritist research. Only four were willing agnostics who were open to the possibility of psychic phenomena. After four or five days of experimentation the reagents in general were not discouraged by the boring routine and expected that they had scored quite well. That was how it felt. Ten thousand trials were made on these subjects. Conditions were varied in numerous ways. The agent was instructed to "image" a drawn card in one of three different ways: visually, kinaesthetically (i.e., by silently uttering the description of a drawn card), and by both together while hearing the name of the card in the imagination. The kinaesthetic mode was an attempt to test Hansen's 1895 hypothesis of involuntary whispering.
In the first 3,000 experiments, the agent changed the distance from the reagent every 20 trials, in order to see if it helped to be close or far away. In the next 2,500 trials the duration of imaging varied between 20 and 60 seconds, with the reagent being allowed to choose the time for some of the series.
For our purposes, however, the most notable innovation was the use of randomized control against regular experiments. In the regular experiment the agent drew a card at random and imaged it. In the control experiment the reagent guessed, but the agent did not look at the card at all. It was decided at random whether the trial would be regular or control. In Coover's description:
The experimenter with a watch before him, (1) shuffles the deck of 40 playing cards (the face cards being discarded),"' cuts the pack, and holds cards concealed; (2) shakes the dice-box, to determine a control or regular experiment, and, if the latter, the form of content the card is to have in his mind; (3) if a regular experiment, he turns over the pack, exposing to his view the under card, taps once to signal the reagent that the experimental period begins, holds mental content of card and wills the content to be projected into the mind of the reagent, and after 15 to 20 or more seconds132 taps twice to signal the close of the interval. After he notes that the reagent has recorded his guess, and has turned to his introspections, he records the color, number, and suit of the card and the number of the die-spot which conditioned the form of the experiment (as, R5H 1, for Red, Five of Hearts, Die-spot 1-i.e., held in Visual Impression). The control experiments ran off in precisely the same form as the regular, except that the card remained unknown until the reagent had recorded his guess.50
The dice box determines the type of "treatment." Outcomes 1, 3 and 5 denote the choice of method of imaging the card (visual, kinaesthetic, or everything).
Outcomes 2, 4, and 6 indicate that a control experiment is to be done. Thus in Coover's design we have both the use of the randomizer (playing cards) for choosing which object is to be guessed and the use of the randomizer (the dice box) to assign one of three possible types of treatment or a control experiment in which there is no treatment.
Here we have the whole retinue of control, blindness, and randomization. It is not for the first time, even in Coover's own researches. His very first experiment in this series, conducted in 1912, prefigures the work with cards, although it involved only one experimenter, Coover, and one reagent, an advanced psychology student. The aim was identical with that of the experiment of the Wingfield sisters, so much admired by Myers but about which I have expressed reservations. The reagent aimed at guessing couplets of numbers from 10 to 99. But instead of using slips of paper, as the Wingfields had, the numbers were chosen at random from "lotto blocks." Lotto was a predecessor of bingo by several centuries and was in the United States more commonly called keno after the 1870s. It is, under the name "lotto," widely in use in state lotteries, while as "keno" it was a recent favorite of competitions for newspaper promotions. Traditionally balls with the numerals from 10 to 99 were used, and a player had to guess five or seven that were drawn at random. Although no amount of vigorous shaking and shuffling of an urn full of ninety balls or blocks will guarantee a great irregularity or freedom from pattern in a long sequence of draws with replacement, it is a far better guarantee than the drawing of ninety slips of paper from a bowl.
Our interest is less in the blocks as an improvement over slips of paper than in their use in combination with a dice box. Everything is now randomized: both the choice of number as "treated" (i.e., known and thought about) or control and the choice of method of transmission. Randomization was coming of age in American departments of psychology, although nowhere, I believe, was it more systematically practiced at such an early date than in this subdepartment of psychical research.
The experimenter sat facing the reagent's back, drew from a bag a Lotto-Block, and, if the numbered side came up, made ready to hold it in some kind of vivid imagery, shook the dice-box, tapped with his pencil once to inform the reagent that the period of impression began, then held or did not hold imagery of the number; and after 15 seconds tapped twice to close the period of impression. When the numbered side of the block came up, imagery was held according to the face cast by the die, as follows: (1) Visual impression; (2) Kinaesthetic image (care being taken to avoid an auditory accompaniment, and also any movements of pronunciation great enough to be felt; (3) Auditory imagery (stripped of its usual kinaesthetic accompaniment); (4) Combination of 1 and 2; (5) of 1 and 3; (6) of 2 and 3. In order that there would be no confusion, the experimenter kept before him a card with the kinds of impressions, or imagery, tabulated by number, upon it. In case the blank side of the block was drawn, the dice-box was shaken, and the experiment progressed in every way like its alternate; except that the experimenter refrained from thinking of numbers (by musing upon an ocean scene).51
It may be instructive that in his description of this inaugural experiment, conducted in 1912-1913, Coover uses the terminology of regular and control experi-ments; he puts the word control in what philosophers more recently have called "scare quotes," that is, he writes of a " 'control' experiment." This may indicate a warning that he is using a novel form of expression. In reporting subsequent experiments he drops the scare quotes. Much earlier, people had talked of having adequate control for experiments-even in the Proceedings of the American SPR and the 1835 referee's report quoted in note 10 above. It would be interesting to speculate, however, that it is Coover to whom we owe the explicit terminology of controlled and control experiments.
Coover's conclusions were clear: "That no trace of an objective thought transference is found either as a capacity shared in a low degree by our normal reagents in general (Richet's 'Suggestion Mentale') or as a capacity enjoyed in any perceptible measure by any of the individual reagents."52 It was also noted that for reagents who had an inner experience of being right on certain occasions there was no correlation between their flashes of certainty and the correctness of their guesses.
Coover's statistical analysis was vastly better than Richet's but still drew largely on Edgeworth's techniques, to which I have alluded. I should note one problem, that of "scoring." The reagents guessed several aspects of a card: its suit, its color, its number. Naturally it is of interest whether colors are transferred better than numbers, or suits better than colors, for in this purely empirical investigation we have no idea what is being transferred. A partially correct guess might be enormously interesting (suppose an agent got the colors right very often, although being sadly inadequate for suits and numbers). Every student of experimental design or of randomization is acquainted with the figure in the first substantial chapter of that book, the lady tasting tea. She asserts that she can tell the difference between a cup of tea to which milk has been added after pouring and a cup of tea with the milk in first. Fisher proposes that she be given eight cups to taste and recommends that the treatment of each cup be decided at random. There are two possibilities. One is that a total of four milk-in-first cups be used, presented with the other four in random order. Fisher prefers the other possibility: that the mixture in each cup be decided at random, so that there might well be five or six milk-in-first cups, and only two or three of the other sort. He grants, however, that the lady might claim that a longish chance run of this sort might impair her ability to make the necessary discernments. It will be recalled that this worry was expressed in the very first randomized experiment, that of Peirce and Jastrow.
We do very probably know the identity of the lady who was subject of the tea-tasting story: Muriel Bishop, a student of algae at Rothamstead.56 She was offended at being offered a cup of tea into which milk had been poured before the tea. Could she really tell the difference? And so the test was conducted, although we do not know the results. 
